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INTRODUCTION 
Through a series of articles spanning more than a decade, Professor 
Stephanos Bibas has proven himself a bold and penetrating critic of 
America’s system of criminal procedure. His theme has been the gap 
between the morality embodied in our substantive criminal law and the 
morality (or, perhaps more accurately, the lack thereof) embodied in our 
procedural rules and practices. This theme now gets its fullest exposition 
in his provocative new book, The Machinery of Criminal Justice.1 
Machinery operates on both a broad, conceptual level and on the 
more specific level of concrete reform proposals. At the conceptual level, 
Professor Bibas argues that our criminal justice system has come to be 
dominated by amoral efficiency considerations to the exclusion of basic, 
lay intuitions regarding morality and justice.2 Professor Bibas looks 
fondly back to the colonial period, when our criminal processes had the 
character of a “visible, participatory morality play.”3 In the hope of 
restoring some of this character, Professor Bibas proposes a host of 
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1 STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012). 
2 See, e.g., id. at 26-27. 
3 Id. at 13; see also id. at 5. 
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specific reforms, ranging from the very modest (email notification to 
crime victims of court dates4) to the very costly (“[p]roviding restorative 
sentencing juries in a million cases a year”5). He also offers some pro-
posals that would be quite controversial for reasons other than cost, such 
as conscripting criminals into military service.6 
Nonetheless, Professor Bibas’s proposals merit careful attention, and 
policymakers should not underestimate their potential appeal. Professor 
Bibas convincingly links his reform agenda to three important contempo-
rary movements in the criminal justice system: victims’ rights, restora-
tive justice, and therapeutic jurisprudence.7 Although he criticizes 
aspects of each of these movements, he also demonstrates that they are 
animated by some of the same basic values as his “morality play” 
vision.8 The fact that each of these movements has had an important 
impact on the American criminal justice system demonstrates that the 
values embodied in these movements can sometimes overcome the 
system’s overriding orientation to efficient case processing. 
But is it possible for the system to undergo a truly fundamental reorien-
tation? Victims’ rights and restorative justice have been around since the 
1970s, while problem-solving courts, the most prominent embodiment of 
therapeutic jurisprudence, have been in operation since the early 1990s. 
Although these movements have achieved noteworthy reforms regarding 
how some types of cases are handled in some jurisdictions, they have not 
reconstituted our criminal justice system as a whole. Indeed, the “machin-
ery” Professor Bibas deplores has proven remarkably durable in the face of 
concerted attacks for decades from both the left and the right. 
Perhaps in recognition of this, Professor Bibas attempts to give added 
rhetorical force to his argument by grounding it in a historical narra-
tive—a sweeping account of the development of the American criminal 
justice system, from colonial times to the present day. Ironically, this 
narrative itself takes the form of a morality play. In Professor Bibas’s 
account, lawyers and intellectual elites are the chief villains.9 He consid-
ers the colonial criminal justice system, which largely dispensed with 
legal professionals and experts, as an ideal of sorts. Once the system 
became professionalized, however, the “insiders” (to use Professor 
Bibas’s shorthand) perverted the system so as to serve their interests and 
 
4 See id. at 150. 
5 See id. at 162. 
6 See id. at 137. 
7 See id. at 88-107. 
8 See id. at 88-89. 
9 See id. at 30-34. 
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reflect their values.10 “Insiders,” he asserts, “have pulled criminal justice 
far from its morality-play moorings.”11 The result is crisis. Still, while 
“[r]eforming a system so broken seems hopeless,”12 Professor Bibas 
urges us not to give up. “[O]utsiders,” he affirms, “can reclaim their role 
as stakeholders and remain outsiders no longer.”13 For their part, 
“[p]rofessionals can live up to their job as public servants. . . . [a]nd 
victims and defendants alike can once again hope to be treated with 
respect, as active participants in a cathartic morality play.”14 
While resonant, this historical narrative glosses over much complexity, 
as Professor Bibas himself acknowledges at various points.15 In this 
review, I will suggest a counter-narrative—one that is no less oversimpli-
fied, but that may nonetheless prove illuminating. My narrative is also a 
story of insiders and outsiders; however, I define these groups not by 
reference to positions in the criminal justice system, but by reference to 
socioeconomic status more generally. In my story, insiders use their 
political power to ensure that the criminal justice system closely supervises 
outsider groups, especially those outsiders who are deemed threats to 
public safety or social order. This agenda may have a moral edge to it, but 
the dynamics are fundamentally different from those of Professor Bibas’s 
morality play. If there is some truth to my counter-narrative, then it may 
reveal some significant obstacles in the way of Professor Bibas’s vision. 
In Part I, I unpack key aspects of Professor Bibas’s account. In Part 
II, I develop my own counter-narrative. Finally, in Part III, I consider the 
implications of my counter-narrative. 
I. CRIMINAL JUSTICE: BACK TO THE FUTURE 
Professor Bibas applauds several aspects of the colonial criminal jus-
tice system. First, the system was overtly moralistic and served to 
enforce community norms—the “local sense of right and wrong.”16 
Second, in the days before lawyers became regular participants, the 
criminal process was transparent and invited lay participation: “There 
were few legal rules and little legalese to cloud the central issues of 
 
10 See id. 
11 Id. at 164. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 165. 
14 Id. 
15 See, e.g., id. at 165 (“The reforms I have suggested are just that, suggestions. Some may 
seem too modest, others too bold and impractical.”). 
16 Id. at 2. 
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factual guilt and moral desert.”17 Trials were held locally and made open to 
the public.18 “Victims and defendants ran the system; they literally had 
their day in court. . . . And the (white male) public participated actively as 
jurors. . . . [T]hey shaped the law, monitored government officials, and 
prevented judicial favoritism and corruption. Trials, in short, empowered 
the people.”19 Third, and finally, the system had a reintegrative orientation: 
Most wrongdoers . . . were viewed as brothers whom fellow citizens 
should help up again after their falls. The job of the criminal justice sys-
tem was to reclaim the errant sheep and reintegrate them into the flock. 
Society should hate the crime but love and redeem the criminal. Only the 
worst, most incorrigible wrongdoers were viewed as irredeemable threats 
who had to be killed or banished.20 
Consistent with this viewpoint, the colonies had, and regularly em-
ployed, a variety of procedural mechanisms for showing mercy to 
convicted defendants, including executive clemency.21 Moreover, 
punishments, while shameful and sometimes intensely physically pain-
ful, were generally of quite limited duration. “The point was to teach a 
swift, memorable lesson and lead errant brethren to submit, repent, and 
make amends. . . . Once wrongdoers did so, the morality play could 
conclude with forgiving and welcoming them back into the fold.”22 
Professor Bibas is quick to acknowledge flaws in the colonial sys-
temsuch as racial bias—but he plainly regards the system as an 
attractive model. He explains, “[O]ur history confirms that this vision [of 
criminal justice as a visible, participatory morality play] was not only 
possible but actually worked, albeit imperfectly.”23 
What led us from this system that “actually worked” to our present, 
“broken”24 system? First, across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
educated opinion turned against moralistic conceptions of criminal 
justice and embraced utilitarian approaches instead. “Deterrence and 
incapacitation,” Professor Bibas notes, became in the minds of the 
proponents of these new rationales, “the key guarantors of low crime 
 
17 Id. at 6. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 3. 
21 See id. at 6-9. 
22 Id. at 11. 
23 Id. at 13. 
24 Id. at 164. 
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rates and thus a secure market economy.”25 Second, in order to enhance 
these desired deterrence effects, the system was professionalized, with the 
development of police forces in the nineteenth century and the increasing 
prominence of lawyers in the criminal trial as prosecutors and defense 
counsel.26 Third, responding to caseload pressures, lawyers invented plea 
bargaining.27 Fourth, punishment moved out of the public square and into 
the private sphere of the prison.28 Finally, in the interest of promoting 
deterrence, addressing complaints of bias, and facilitating plea-bargaining, 
executive clemency and other forms of mercy were curtailed.29 In sum, as 
Professor Bibas puts it, “criminal justice moved from a common-sense, 
public moral judgment to a technical, hidden, opaque process. It was no 
longer about communal expressions of justice and deserved punishment, 
but about speedy professional triage of threats.”30 
Professor Bibas convincingly identifies a number of costs to this tran-
sition. For one thing, the opacity of criminal procedure and punishment 
means that “current and prospective wrongdoers, victims, and the public 
neither see justice done nor hear the law’s message.”31 The system thus 
undermines its own proper goals of deterrence, education, vindication of 
victims, and expression of condemnation.32 Moreover, public frustration 
with this system diminishes public respect for the law and legal system, 
which may ultimately diminish compliance with the law.33 Professor 
Bibas reports survey results that show “nearly three-quarters of Ameri-
cans lack much confidence and trust in the criminal justice system,” 
while two-thirds object to plea-bargaining as particularly “opaque and 
insider-dominated.”34 Finally, because there are no other apparent outlets 
for the expression of “outsider” frustration with the system, the public 
resorts to crude and misguided legal reforms, such as three-strikes laws 
and other mandatory minimum sentences.35 
Professor Bibas’s argument echoes the work of several other legal 
scholars and social scientists over the past two decades—Tom Tyler, Bill 
Stuntz, Dan Kahan, and Tracey Meares, to name a few—and Professor 
 
25 Id. at 15. 
26 See id. at 15-18. 
27 See id. at 18-20. 
28 See id. at 20-23. 
29 See id. at 23-26. 
30 Id. at 27. 
31 Id. at 50. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. at 50-51. 
34 Id. at 51. 
35 Id. at 52-53. 
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Bibas graciously acknowledges the importance of their contributions.36 
Still, if most of these points are familiar, they are no less compelling for 
that reason, and Professor Bibas gives them an unusually forceful and 
effective articulation. Professor Bibas’s encompassing, system-wide 
perspective is a particularly helpful contribution; his book is not just 
about substantive criminal law, or criminal procedure, or policing, or 
sentencing, or corrections, or clemency, but about the entire system, and 
he is consistently insightful as to the subtle interactions, and cumulative 
effect, of each of these elements. 
I expect most readers will come away from the book convinced that the 
system should move in the direction Professor Bibas advocates: that it 
should attend more carefully to lay moral intuitions; should be more 
localized, transparent, and participatory; should punish more publicly and 
less harshly; and should provide an easier path to reintegration for the 
offender. Importantly, though, Professor Bibas is not an absolutist about 
such matters. He does not contend that we are subject to some moral 
imperative to recreate colonial criminal justice, or something like it.  
For instance, he is able to make peace with plea bargaining. He does 
not urge a (ruinously expensive) return to the time when nearly every 
conviction was obtained through a jury trial, but instead proposes re-
forms to the plea-bargaining system. Still, his account of colonial crimi-
nal justice occupies a central place in his argument because it proves that 
his vision can “actually work[].”37 In the morality play that is his history 
of American criminal justice, the colonial period was America’s peno-
logical Garden of Eden. While we may not expect a full return, Professor 
Bibas argues that we must look backward in order to move forward.38 
II. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AS OUTSIDER CONTROL 
I move now to my counter-narrative. For present purposes, I will  
accept Professor Bibas’s account of the colonial period. There are, to be 
sure, ample grounds to quibble with any generalizations about the beliefs 
and practices of a set of culturally distinct and geographically far-flung 
colonies, over a period that lasted more than a century and a half. For 
what it’s worth, I might particularly question Professor Bibas’s charac-
terization of the power of ordinary, lay jurors.39 But, in any event, let us 
 
36 See, e.g., id. at 195 n.46, 220 n.19, 240 nn.26-27. 
37 Id. at 13. 
38 See id. at 164-65. 
39 Colonial society was marked by a level of hierarchy and deference that is difficult for contempo-
rary Americans to appreciate. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
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assume that the period before the Revolution—and perhaps even in the 
first few decades thereafter—was a time when criminal justice had much 
more the character of Professor Bibas’s public morality play than it does 
now. So what happened? 
Professor Bibas says little about what may have been the most im-
portant change in American society in the nineteenth century: a massive 
influx of immigrants, many of whom came from parts of Europe that had 
not previously played an important role in populating the New World. 
Immigration to the United States accelerated quickly after the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars and with the development of improved means of trans-
portation. During the 1820s and 1830s, more than 667,000 immigrants 
landed on our shores, and the number of new arrivals grew to more than 
4.2 million in the 1840s and 1850s.40 Distressingly (to the native born, at 
least), a large proportion of these immigrants were Catholics, many from 
Ireland and Germany. America’s Catholics grew from 150,000 in 1815 to 
about a million in 1850, and became America’s single largest religious 
denomination after the Civil War.41 In the nineteenth century, as today, the 
sudden appearance of large numbers of culturally distinct immigrants 
provoked considerable anxiety among the native born.42 
“[T]he history of criminal justice,” Lawrence Friedman has written, is 
“a history of power.”43 Professor Bibas, quite correctly, sees the substan-
tive criminal law as an embodiment of morality. But Friedman invites us 
to consider whose morality the full coercive power of the state backs. In 
 
AMERICAN HISTORY 30 (1993) (arguing that American colonial society “was certainly hierar-
chical—with a vengeance”). In such a system, ordinary jurors tended to follow the lead of the 
judge. The fact that judges bothered to comment on evidence certainly suggests as much. See 
BIBAS, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing how colonial judges often gave jurors instructions detailing 
the judge’s view of the case). Writing about English trials in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, John Langbein has identified a host of different mechanisms available to 
common law judges to control juries and documents instances in which judges succeeded in 
imposing their will upon jurors. John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 263, 284-300 (1978). A clear example of this occurred in the New World in the 
infamous Salem witch trials. See Robert Calef, More Wonders of the Invisible World (1700), reprinted 
in NARRATIVES OF THE WITCHCRAFT CASES, 1648-1706, at 296, 358 (George Lincoln Burr ed., 
1914), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=4hgOAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source 
=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false. Indeed, juries were rarely used at all in the 
Puritan colonies in the seventeenth century; local elites serving as magistrates were “in firm 
control.” FRIEDMAN, supra, at 25. 
40 DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT 526-27 (2007). 
41 Id. at 198, 201. 
42 See, e.g., DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN UNDERWORLD 12 (1979) (de-
scribing how Anglo-Saxon Americans in the antebellum period reacted to the arrival of immigrants 
from diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds by focusing more heavily on crime prevention). 
43 FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 10. 
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any society, there are certain dominant groups that normally decide these 
things, and their preferences about where to draw the lines—what gets 
criminalized and to what extent, what gets prioritized by police and 
prosecutors—often have a self-serving character. It is commonly recog-
nized that the moral values served by the criminal justice system of the Jim 
Crow South began, and practically ended, with the principle of white 
supremacy. Although the criminal justice of the northern United States has 
not so blatantly and persistently been built around a “morality” of social 
domination, the northern criminal justice system (and everywhere else in 
the United States for that matter) has regularly been used by insiders to 
control outsiders—to neutralize the threats they pose, and perhaps, more 
ambitiously, to make them think and act more like the insiders. 
Again, what happened to our colonial idyll? Recall Professor Bibas’s 
account of the colonial desire for reintegration: wrongdoers “were viewed 
as brothers whom fellow citizens should help up again after their falls. The 
job of the criminal justice system was to reclaim the errant sheep and 
reintegrate them into the flock.”44 This view is, of course, premised on 
feelings of close kinship between wrongdoers and their “fellow citizens.”45 
The goal of “reintegrating [wrongdoers] into the flock”46 assumes that the 
wrongdoer formerly had a place in the fold. But if the wrongdoer is not 
regarded as a “brother” and never had a place in the fold, what then? That 
was the question presented in increasingly urgent and disturbing ways to 
native-born Americans between 1820 and 1860. 
It is no accident that this time period coincides precisely with the de-
velopment of America’s first professional police forces.47 These police 
forces were formed to keep order on the streets of America’s largest 
cities in the wake of mass outbreaks of violence directed against Catho-
lics and blacks.48 That is, these were specifically preventive police 
forces.49 Note that preventive policing sits uneasily at the front end of the 
criminal-justice-as-morality-play vision. The essential orientation of 
preventive policing is toward monitoring, intimidating, and exercising 
physical control over those outsiders believed to present the greatest 
 
44 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 3. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 68-69. 
48 Id. 
49 JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 27 (describing how cities like Philadelphia responded to urban 
violence in the mid-1800s with reforms aimed at creating a preventive police force). 
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danger to public safety and order.50 This does not correspond well with 
the morality-play ideal: in the preventive model, individuals are targeted 
not so much for things they have done in the past as for what they are 
believed likely to do in the future. A conviction in this setting, moreover, 
cannot function merely as a temporary brand for a “brother” who is 
expected in due course to resume a prior position of respectability in the 
community, but serves instead as an officialand often perma-
nentconfirmation of outsider status. 
Preventive policing goes hand-in-hand with vice regulation. Vice is 
commonplace at all levels of society—among insiders and outsiders alike—
so the criminalization of vice effectively gives preventive police vast 
discretion to arrest those whom they regard as most threatening. Moreover, 
while all classes may indulge in vice, it is commonly presumed—perhaps 
with good reason—that vice gives rise to greater social pathologies among 
the lower classes than elsewhere. This presumption provides a ready justifi-
cation for police to focus their vice enforcement efforts against the outsiders. 
Finally, vice prosecutions normally do not involve messy questions of mens 
rea and can often be built around the testimony of police officers (thus 
dispensing with the inconvenience of lay witnesses).51 
Little wonder, then, that public support for vice regulation surged at 
the same time that immigration surged and America’s police forces were 
first established. Culminating the antebellum anti-vice crusade, Maine 
adopted its famous prohibition law in 1851 and was quickly imitated by a 
dozen other states.52 Such vice-control statutes were not mere window 
dressing, either. David Bodenhamer’s study of Indianapolis, for instance, 
found that more than fifty percent of criminal prosecutions between 1823 
and 1860 were for crimes against “Moral Order,” nearly all for gambling 
 
50 This orientation is expressed through police decisionmaking at both a macro level (e.g., 
decisions to concentrate resources in certain neighborhoods) and a micro level (e.g., decisions by 
individual officers about whether to make an arrest for a minor infraction or let the perpetrator go 
with a warning). 
51 I assume here that the vice being prosecuted is out in the open: public drunkenness, 
streetwalking prostitution, open-air drug markets, and the like. It would be a much more 
complicated matter to prosecute illicit indulgence that takes place discretely behind the walls of 
private homes. Such indulgence, however, has not typically been the sort of vice on which 
American police focus their attention. Historians refer to this double standard in its nineteenth 
century form, as the Victorian Compromise. FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 127. 
52 Id. at 134. 
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or illegal alcohol sales.53 He also found evidence of persistent public 
pressure for even more aggressive enforcement of vice laws.54 
Chicago provides an especially telling illustration of the close connec-
tion between nativism, vice regulation, and policing in antebellum Ameri-
ca.55 By the 1850s, nearly half of Chicago’s population was foreign born. 
The flood of new arrivals was accompanied by perceptions of a crime 
wave in the city and calls for the creation of a police force. The Irish 
Catholics were a particular source of concern for their drinking, fighting, 
and generally rowdy behavior. A small, daytime police force was estab-
lished in 1853, but the force seemed entirely inadequate for the goal of 
genuine preventive policing. Then, in 1855, the nativist Know-Nothing 
party joined forces with the pro-temperance Maine Law Alliance to 
secure the election of Levi Boone as mayor on a Law and Order ticket. 
Boone immediately sought to beef up the police force, and, whether 
intentionally or not, helped to ensure the adoption of his reforms by 
precipitating a major riot. This violent, armed confrontation between the 
police and German saloon keepers resulted from Boone’s decision to 
raise the license fee for saloons from $50 per year to $300. The city 
council responded to the riot by creating a new eighty person police 
force, all of whom had to write, read, and speak English. Boone, in fact, 
appointed only native-born Americans to the force. In sum, the linked 
goals of controlling violent, disorderly outsiders and regulating vice 
plainly drove the development of Chicago’s new preventive police force. 
A criminal justice system oriented to vice regulation poses difficult 
challenges for the morality-play model, especially in the increasingly 
diverse and secular United States that emerged in the nineteenth century. 
For one thing, in a vice prosecution, there is no victim to vindicate, at 
least not in any morally clear-cut way.56 To be sure, there were plenty of 
 
53 DAVID J. BODENHAMER, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 140 tbl.2 (Harold Hyman & Stuart 
Bruchey eds., 1986). 
54 See id. at 28. 
55 I draw this illustration from JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 35-38. Individual citations are omitted. 
56 It is true, of course, that some vice crime can be quite harmful, albeit in diffuse or causally 
complex ways. Today, for instance, it is widely recognized that open air drug markets in America’s 
inner cities harm the neighborhoods in which they operate: they may be associated with violent 
gang conflict; they are magnets for drug-dependent, crime-prone individuals; they demoralize and 
drive away the “good people” in the neighborhood; and so forth. For that reason, it is possible to 
conceive of an entire neighborhood as the victim of a vice offense and to involve neighborhood 
representatives in the criminal process in some of the ways that conventional victims might be 
involved in other sorts of cases. I have made a proposal to this effect in Michael M. O’Hear, 
Rethinking Drug Courts: Restorative Justice as a Response to Racial Injustice, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 463, 490-93 (2009). This kind of involvement seems workable in a sentencing hearing or as 
an alternative to a sentencing hearing, such as a community conference structured on restorative 
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vice prosecutions in the colonial period—the golden age of the 
morality play—but those prosecutions were underwritten by intensely 
felt, widely shared religious beliefs. “The courts acted, in a way, as 
secular arms of the churches . . . .”57 But, exemplifying new attitudes 
toward the role of religion in public life, churches across America 
were disestablished in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries; religious faith could no longer play the vital role it once had 
enjoyed in the colonial criminal justice system.58  
This points to a second, related challenge posed by vice prosecutions: 
without a religious underpinning, it is not clear on what basis and under 
what circumstances vice can be regarded as a moral wrong. Some kinds 
of vice—particularly those involving intoxication—can make a person 
dangerous, but dangers abound in human society, and the line between 
dangerous and immoral is uncertain and contested, to say the least. 
Likewise, vice may be unpleasant—perhaps revolting—for some people 
to witness or even to contemplate, but it is not clear at what point such 
distaste raises a genuine issue of public morality. Similarly uncertain, at 
least in a society like ours with strong libertarian traditions, is the extent 
to which public morality may be paternalistic—may take into account the 
self-injury suffered by the person who indulges in vice. In a society of 
increasing cultural diversity, we can expect stark social divisions on such 
questions. If a central function of the morality play is to reinforce shared 
moral norms, vice prosecutions in the nineteenth century and afterwards 
may be unable to perform this function effectively; instead, at least in the 
eyes of some segments of society, vice prosecutions will amount to 
nothing more than a favored group imposing its moral norms on its less-
favored counterparts. 
Other challenges arise from the ubiquity of vice. If the criminal jus-
tice system takes as one of its chief objectives the punishment of vice, 
caseload pressures are a predictable consequence. It should thus be no 
 
justice ideals. It does not work very well, though, in a trial on guilt or innocence, where the 
conventional victim’s role is normally limited to eyewitness testimony regarding the specific 
conduct constituting the offense for which the defendant has been charged. Because harm is not 
normally an element of vice offenses, there is no apparent role for a proxy or indirect victim in the 
trial. Moreover, even in sentencing or other proceedings in which neighborhood harms are 
arguably relevant, the uncertain or indirect causal relationship between the offense and harm may 
in some cases greatly attenuate the moral force and significance of the confrontation between 
offender and “victim.” 
57 FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 34. See also Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The 
Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1448-1540. 
58 Cf. id. at 54-55. (discussing the change during the eighteenth century in the nature of 
prosecutions because the “tight reins of the theocracy loosened under pressure”). 
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surprise that plea bargaining—the practice that is at the root of so many 
of the contemporary problems that Professor Bibas identifies59—first 
established itself in the nineteenth century in liquor prosecutions.60 
Given the ubiquity of vice, full enforcement is a practical impossibil-
ity, and vice cases will often be tainted by the odor of selective 
prosecution. The upper classes indulge in vice no less than the lower 
classes, but the lower classes—for reasons good or ill61—will bear the 
brunt of the criminal justice system’s war on vice. And perceptions of 
official hypocrisy and group-based discrimination surely drain the 
morality play of its full and intended potency. 
In sum, during the nineteenth century, the American criminal justice 
system newly embraced three, critically important, mutually reinforcing 
objectives: preventive policing, regulation of vice, and control of cultur-
ally distinct outsider groups. Each of these objectives put significant 
pressure on the old, colonial morality-play model. And none of these 
objectives emerged in any distinctive way from the system’s insiders—
that is, the lawyers and repeat players who comprise Professor Bibas’s 
“insiders.” Rather, these objectives reflected the values and interests of 
my “insiders”—the social class or classes to whom politically accounta-
ble government officials are normally responsive. In nineteenth-century 
America, this class was native-born, propertied, white, male Protestants.  
The subsequent history is messy and complicated, and I could not 
explore it in any systematic way here. (Indeed, the bit of antebellum 
history I’ve been focusing on is quite a bit messier than I’ve made it out 
to be.) Suffice it to say that preventive policing, vice regulation, and 
control of outsiders remained important aspects of American criminal 
justice well past the nineteenth century. Indeed, the set of criminal justice 
priorities that emerged in the decades before the Civil War may have 
reached their apogee during Prohibition in the 1920s.  
But, even with the collapse of Prohibition in 1933, some of the 
basic impulses that animated antebellum criminal justice remained 
strong, albeit channeled in different directions. The New Deal perma-
nently realigned “insider” and “outsider” groups in the United States.62 
However, as previously marginalized groups of European descent were 
 
59 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 18-20. 
60 George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 904-11 (2000) (discussing the 
history of plea bargaining in liquor cases). 
61 For a discussion of the potential justifications for present-day racial disparities in the so-
called “war on drugs,” see O’Hear, supra note 56, at 466-72. 
62 See Heather Ann Thompson, Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and 
Transformation in Postwar American History, 97 J. AM. HIST. 703, 707 (2010).  
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brought inside the tent, blacks and Latinos were left behind.63 As this 
new group of “insiders” grew more tolerant of drinking and some other 
vices, they became increasingly concerned about drug use, culminating 
in the so-called “war on drugs” of the late twentieth century.64 
Today, there is still plenty of evidence that the system is oriented in 
important and mutually reinforcing ways toward preventive policing, 
vice regulation, and control of outsider groups. The New York Police 
Department, for instance, is widely praised and imitated for its particular-
ly aggressive approach to preventive policing.65 Exemplifying this 
approach, the NYPD increased its number of citizen stops from about 
97,296 in 2002 to a mind-boggling 685,724 in 2011.66 The NYPD’s 
“basic methodology,” as Franklin Zimring puts it, “is trying to take 
control of potentially threatening situations by street stops of suspicious-
looking persons, by frisking after stops for weapons or contraband, and 
by making arrests for minor offenses as a way to remove perceived risks 
from the street and to identify persons wanted for other crimes.”67 The 
enforcement of vice laws plays a crucial role in this strategy. For in-
stance, the number of misdemeanor marijuana arrests in New York City 
skyrocketed from 774 in 1991 to more than 51,000 in 2000, and has 
remained in the tens of thousands per year since then.68 
On a national level, the central role of drug enforcement in the con-
temporary criminal justice system hardly requires documentation. From 
1990 to 2006, more than one-third of felony defendants in the nation’s 
seventy-five largest counties faced drug charges—a higher proportion 
than those who were charged with either violent or property offenses.69 
Meanwhile, in the federal system, nearly sixty percent of prison inmates 
are being incarcerated as a result of drug convictions.70 
 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 707-10. 
65 See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE 100-31 (2012) 
(describing the changes to the New York City Police Department after 1990 and the subsequent 
impact on the city’s crime rate). 
66 N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK 2011, at 3 (2012), available at www.nyclu.org/ 
files/publications/NYCLU_2011_Stop-and-Frisk_Report.pdf. 
67 ZIMRING, supra note 65, at 118. 
68 Id. at 121 fig.5.10. 
69 THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU 
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Whether the system still seeks to control socially disfavored outsider 
groups has been a subject of much debate—debate that has particularly 
focused on alleged discrimination against blacks and Latinos—but the 
existence of dramatic disparities in the system cannot be denied. Among 
those 685,724 stops conducted by the NYPD in 2011, more than half 
involved blacks,71 a demographic that constitutes less than one quarter of 
the city’s population. Likewise, between 2006 and 2009, more than fifty-
five percent of the NYPD’s marijuana arrestees were black72—a seem-
ingly stark illustration of the confluence of preventive policing, vice 
regulation, and outsider control. Nationally, the black percentage of the 
prison population is about three times greater than the black percentage 
of the overall U.S. population, and the raw number of blacks imprisoned 
for drug offenses is more than twice the number of whites.73 
It is not clear whether and to what extent such numbers are driven by 
group-based animus, as, for instance, criminal justice reforms in the 
antebellum period were driven by overt animus against Irish Catholics.74 
Even the bare perception of unfair discrimination, though, presents a 
problem for the sort of moral dynamics that Professor Bibas would like to 
see in our criminal justice system.  
I do not mean to be overly reductive. I do not contend that prevention, 
vice regulation, and outsider control are the only, or even necessarily the 
predominant, objectives of the contemporary criminal justice system. 
Our system presents many distinct faces to the world; I have only dis-
cussed three of them. But, to whatever extent these remain important 
aspects of American criminal justice, they seem no less a challenge to the 
morality-play vision today than they did in the nineteenth century. 
III. PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 
Can these challenges be overcome? The answer likely depends in part 
on the level of public support for those aspects of the system that are in 
greatest tension with the morality-play ideal. Professor Bibas points to 
survey data showing great dissatisfaction with the criminal justice status 
 
71 N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 66, at 5. 
72 ZIMRING, supra note 65, at 123 tbl.5.1. 
73 O’Hear, supra note 56, at 466-67. 
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quo,75 but I am not sure this can be fairly construed as a public rejection of 
particular aspects of the system like preventive policing, much less as a 
public endorsement of the morality-play model. Nor is it even clear to me 
that the survey data really tell us much about attitudes toward the criminal 
justice system per se. Americans seem generally unhappy with govern-
ment these days, and responses regarding criminal justice may simply 
reflect more sweeping attitudes. Certainly, criminal justice has not figured 
in any prominent way in the recent Presidential race, nor does it otherwise 
seem to be anywhere near the top of the list of voter concerns. Professor 
Bibas’s survey data regarding plea bargaining are more to the point,76 but 
also leave one wondering to what extent negative public attitudes reflect 
the sorts of concerns Professor Bibas articulates and to what extent they 
are driven by a desire for more severity pure and simple.  
In any event, inquiring about national public opinion may not be the 
most productive way of proceeding. Attitudes toward preventive polic-
ing, the war on drugs, and the like seem to implicate fundamental and 
contested social values, and we should expect different opinions among 
different social groups. For instance, a recent survey of New Yorkers 
regarding the NYPD’s preventive policing tactics revealed—not surpris-
ingly—different attitudes among whites and blacks. While fifty-five 
percent of whites said that the aggressive stop-and-frisk policy was 
acceptable, fifty-six percent of blacks regarded it as unacceptable.77  
Given the diversity of relevant attitudes, we may better appreciate the 
significance and value of Professor Bibas’s call for more transparency 
and decentralization in the criminal justice system, and greater empow-
erment of citizens on the local level.78 Professor Bibas’s proposals would 
allow for the expression of diverse viewpoints on those objectives and 
practices in the system that are most at odds with the morality-play ideal. 
This may be especially valuable in light of racial considerations. If our 
overriding objective is a criminal justice system that speaks to the 
defendant as a “brother,” that has legitimacy when it attempts to deliver 
moral condemnation on behalf of the defendant’s community, and that 
can credibly promise eventual reintegration into the community, there 
may be no greater challenge today than the simple fact that the people 
 
75 See BIBAS, supra note 1, at 196 n.49. 
76 Id. at 178 n.62. 
77 Michael M. Grynbaum & Marjorie Connelly, Majority of New Yorkers View Police as Biased 
Toward Whites, Survey Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, at A15. 
78 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 144-50, 156-64. 
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who design and enforce our criminal justice system tend to look very 
different than the bulk of the people who are processed through it.  
Greater localization may alleviate these racially charged insider–
outsider dynamics. Many of our major cities today are now majority-
minority, and others are very nearly so; blacks and Latinos play a vital 
role in the local politics of these urban centers. Allowing for more 
decisionmaking at the city level would give these majorities a voice in 
how criminal justice is conceived and enacted in a way they presently 
lack. Better still might be decisionmaking, or at least systematic consulta-
tion, at the neighborhood level. 
To be sure, people of color are not morally united and socially cohe-
sive in the way that we imagine the Puritan villagers of New England to 
have been. Commonly used phrases like the “black community” mask a 
diversity of viewpoints and status distinctions. Even within groups 
traditionally regarded as marginalized, there are insiders and outsiders.  
Furthermore, insider–outsider dynamics are probably an inevitable 
feature of our criminal justice system. It is doubtful that even the colonial 
period was wholly immune; the Salem witch trials, for instance, are 
sometimes depicted in these terms.79 In the idealized moral economy that 
Professor Bibas envisions, those who punish will probably always feel 
contempt for the social inferiors within their power, and those who are 
punished will feel resentment toward the members of the privileged 
classes who exercise power over them.80  
But the threat is a question of degree. The insider-outside problem 
may be a low-grade distraction from the morality play—a nagging, but 
barely audible whisper from a few rows back. Or it may be a thunderous 
roar that entirely drowns out the actors’ lines, like the travesties of Jim 
Crow justice. Or, of course, it may be something in between. The prob-
lem is surely amplified when the insider–outsider dynamics are racial-
ized, at least in a country with our sorry history of racial oppression. To the 
extent that some of Professor Bibas’s proposals can help to soften the racial 
tensions associated with our criminal justice system, they do offer some 
hope that the system’s efforts to engage with offenders on a moral level 
may have greater legitimacy and effectiveness. 
 
 
79 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 46-47 (claiming that the Salem witch trials were moti-
vated at least in part by “[t]own rivalries and factions” and bias against “deviant” women). 
80 For a provocative exploration of the psychology of those who punish, see James Q. Whitman, 
Making Happy Punishers, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2698, 2715-19 (2005) (reviewing MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004)). 
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